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LEGISLATION AGAINST SMOKING POLLUTION 
Paul Axel-Lute* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
From the first appearance of the tobacco habit, legislators have 
tried to restrict smoking in order to prevent immorality, disease, 
and fire. I Legislation specifically addressed to air pollution caused 
by smoking first appeared during the latter half of the nineteenth 
and the early part of the twentieth centuries in the form of ordi-
nances prohibiting smoking in streetcars2 and subways.3 In the early 
1900's, state legislatures began to pass laws restricting smoking in 
enclosed public places, with the apparent purpose of preventing 
indoor air pollution.4 This initial anti-smoking movement, however, 
made little headway after World War I, when smoking came to be 
considered a generally acceptable form of behavior. For some time, 
nonsmokers bowed to societal pressure and either remained silent 
or brooked the wrath of smokers who were indignant if anyone ques-
tioned their right to smoke when and where they pleased.5 
• Federal Documents Librarian, Rutgers Law School Library, Newark, N.J. 
, See History of Tobacco Regulation, in 1 MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING, THE 
TECHNICAL PAPERS OF THE FIRST REPORT OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON MARIHUANA & DRUG ABUSE, 
517-20 app. (1972). 
2 The preamble of a New Orleans ordinance quoted in State v. Heidenhaim, 42 La. Ann. 
483, 7 So. 621 (1890), indicates that these prohibitions were widespread: 
Whereas, the custom of permitting smoking in the street-cars of this city is a most vile 
and objectionable one to the majority of our citizens, . . . and whereas, this alone, of all 
the cities of the Union, allows such a discomfort to those of its citizens who ride in the 
public cars. . . . 
42 La. Ann. at 484-85, 7 So. at 621. 
3 See, e.g., N.Y.C. SANITARY CODE § 187 (1910) . 
• E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-101 et seq. (1921 Utah Laws ch. 145, as amended, 1976 
Utah Laws ch. 10). North Dakota enacted a similar law a few days before Utah, but repealed 
it in 1937. 1921 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 127, repealed, 1937 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 217. 
, C. VAN PROOSDY, SMOKING 37-38 (1960); Speer, Tobacco & The Non-Smoker, 16 ARCH. 
ENVIRON. HEALTH 443 (1968). For further details of anti-smoking history, see A. HAMILTON, 
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This situation began to change in the 1960's with increased public 
awareness of air pollution problems and mounting medical evidence 
concerning the harmfulness of tobacco smoke.6 By 1971, two nation-
wide anti-smoking groups, Action for Smoking and Health,7 and the 
Group Against Smokers' Pollution,8 had been formed. From 1973 to 
1976, thirteen states passed broad nonsmokers' protection acts,9 
numerous municipalities passed ordinances of similar scope,IO and 
federal regulatory agencies restricted smoking on interstate planes, 11 
buses,12 and trainsY In 1976, nonsmoking workers won a significant 
judicial victory in Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, 14 
THIS SMOKING WORLD 201-16 (1927); E. CORTI, HISTORY OF SMOKING 110-16, 269-71 (1931); J. 
ROBERT, THE STORY OF TOBACCO IN AMERICA 248-55 (1949); Martin, A Bill of Rights for 
Nonsmokers, 3 STUDENT LAWYER (no. 6) 23 (Feb. 1975); Cobey, The Resurgence and Validity 
of Antismoking Legislation, 7 U.C.D. L. REv. See also note 1, supra. 
• See notes 16-18, infra, and accompanying text. 
7 Founded by John Banzhaf in 1967, this group is "the legal action arm of the antismoking 
community." Newsletter, Action on Smoking & Health (bimonthly, 1971 to date) (Action on 
Smoking & Health, P.O. Box 19556, Washington, D.C. 20006). It is interesting to note that 
this was not the first "nonsmokers' rights" group. In 1910, Dr. Charles Giffin Pease founded 
the Nonsmokers' Protective League of America. N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1933, at 26, col. 3. 
• Information from Group Against Smokers' Pollution, P.O. Box 632, College Park, Md. 
20740. Founded by Clara Gowin in 1971. 
• ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.35.300-18.35.340 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-601.01 (1974); GA. CODE 
§ 26-9910 (1975); 1975 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 310; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 270, § 21 (1975); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 144.411-144.417 (West 1975); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1031, as amended, 1975 
Neb. Laws ch. 75; NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.249 (1975); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 1399-0 to 1399-
q (Supp. 1975); OHIO REV. CODE § 3791.031 (Page 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1247 (West 
Supp. 1975); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-36-2 (Supp. 1975); TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 
10, § 48.01 (Vernon Supp. 1975). For abstracts of these laws, and for citations and abstracts 
of laws restricting smoking in particular situations,see U.S. NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR 
SMOKING AND HEALTH, LEGISLATION REGULATING SMOKING ARE,l.s: A SELECTIVE ANNOTATED BIB-
LIOGRAPHY THROUGH JUNE 1976. 
'0 E.g., Arlington, Mass. By-Laws art. 12, § 14 (Art. 48 of Warrant for Annual Town 
l\1eeting, 1975); DAVIS, CALIF. CITY CODE ch. 11, art. 3, § 11.23-11.27 (Ordinance 657, Apr. 
16, 1973); DULUTH, MINN. CITY CODE § 34-40 (Ordinance 8112, Nov. 12, 1974); EL CAJON, 
CALIF. CITY CODE ch. 18C (Ordinance 2879, Aug. 5, 1975); FT. LAUDERDALE, FLA. CODE § 28-
80 (Ordinance C-75-6, Mar. 4, 1975); N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 181.17 (adopted by res. ofBd. 
of Health, July 25, 1974); SACRAMENTO, CALIF. CITY CODE ch. 37 (Jan. 24, 1974); SAN DIEGO 
COUNTY, CALIF. CODE OF REGULATORY ORDINANCES §§ 32.801-32.811 (Ordinance 4556, n.s., Aug. 
19, 1975). Other municipalities with such ordinances are listed in ACTION ON SMOKING & 
HEALTH, DIGEST OF STATE NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS LEGISLATION (1976) (Action on Smoking & 
Health, P.O. Box 19556, Washington, D.C. 20006). 
II Civil Aeronautics Board, Provision of Designated "No Smoking" Areas Aboard Aircraft, 
14 C.F.R. § 252 (1977) (history of rule-making is found at 38 Fed. Reg. 12207 (1973) (proposed 
amendment at 41 Fed. Reg. 44427 (1976)); Federal Aviation Admin., Smoking on Aircraft 
... Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 35 Fed. Reg. 5045 (1970). . 
12 49 C.F.R. § 1061.1 (1972), upheld in National Ass'n of Motor Bus Owners v. United 
States, 370 F. Supp. 408 (D.C. 1974); amended, 41 Fed. Reg. 45843 (1976). 
13 49 C.F.R. § 1124.22 (1974), amended, 41 Fed. Reg. 22948 (1976). 
" 145 N.J. Super 516, 368 A.2d 408 (Ch. Div., 1976); discussed at notes 55-58, infra. 
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establishing a right to a workplace free of tobacco smoke. 
This article examines legal solutions to the problem of air pollu-
tion caused by smoking. After discussing the balance between the 
interests of nonsmokers and smokers, the article analyzes the judi-
cial remedies available to the nonsmoker under both the U.S. Con-
stitution and the common law. Concluding that these remedies are 
of limited usefulness, the article then considers legislation which 
might be more broadly effective. While federal, state and local legis-
lation are equally appropriate to the problem, the article concludes 
that state legislation is the most comprehensive and effective means 
of dealing with smoking pollution. A basic legislative scheme is sug-
gested (see Appendix) in which smoking is segregated where possi-
ble, and prohibited where effective segregation is not possible. 
II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SMOKERS AND NONSMOKERS 
A. Tobacco Smoke as Air Pollution 
Tobacco smoke contains many substances, including carbon 
monoxide, a known poisonous gas, and other carcinogenic and irri-
tant particulates. 15 The most common effect of tobacco smoke is 
irritation of the eyes, nose, or throat. Persons who are allergic or 
sensitive to tobacco smoke may suffer additional symptoms such as 
headache, cough, wheezing, or nausea. 16 Carbon monoxide can be 
particularly dangerous to persons suffering from lung or heart dis-
easesY The "sidestream" smoke, which goes directly from the 
burning end of a cigarette into the air, contains greater concentra-
tions of the pollutants which cause these problems than the 
"mainstream" smoke, which is filtered by both the cigarette and the 
smoker's lungs before being released to the air. The average smoker 
produces more sidestream than mainstream smoke. 18 
Tobacco smoke generally becomes an air pollution problem only 
in the indoor situation, since it is readily dispersed and diluted when 
outdoors. Indoor concentrations of pollutants from tobacco smoke 
depend primarily on the type and number of tobacco products being 
smoked, the size of the room, and the quality of ventilation. It is 
important to note that ventilation cannot be a complete solution. 
15 u.s. CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING, 88-98 (1975). 
" u.S. HEALTH SERVICES & MENTAL HEALTH ADMIN., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOK-
ING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 128 (1972); Speer, supra note 5. 
17 U.S. HEALTH SERVICES & MENTAL HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 16, at 131. 
" [d. at 88-89. 
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Even with good ventilation, indoor smoke concentrations often ex-
ceed the limit set by the Environmental Protection Agency to ensure 
the healthfulness of the outdoor (ambient) air.ls Further, since con-
centrations of pollutants in the immediate vicinity of a smoker are 
greater than those in the room as a whole, no amount of ventilation 
will prevent irritation of the sensitive person next to the smoker. 
Indeed, excessive ventilation may even cause an additional air 
contamination hazard in the form of airborne ashes produced by 
burning tobacco. 2o 
B. The Need To Smoke 
Whether smoking is properly labeled an addiction or a mere habit 
is disputed. The official view, as of 1964,21 was that smoking is a 
habit-that is, a psychological rather than physical dependence, 
with no characteristic withdrawal syndrome, little tendency to in-
crease dosage, and detrimental effects primarily on the individual 
rather than society. In recent years, a more favored opinion is that 
most smokers are physically addicted to nicotine. Evidence in sup-
port of this view includes the facts that most smokers average at 
least one cigarette consumed per waking hour; that substantial 
numbers of smokers experience symptoms such as drowsiness, head-
aches, and digestive disturbances during withdrawal; and that the 
habit is very hard to stop permanently.22 In either case, the average 
smoker is not merely indulging in an optional pleasure but is satisfy-
ing a compelling need to smoke. 
To conclude that smoking is compUlsive is not to say that it 
cannot be legally restricted for a valid purpose such as fire preven-
tion or pollution prevention.23 Smoking, while compulsive, cannot 
II Id. at 88-90. 
28 In Jones v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 159 Misc. 662, 288 N.Y.S. 523 (Sup. Ct., 
1936), a passenger on a bus which had its windows open was injured when ashes from the 
lighted cigarette of a fellow passenger, who was smoking in violation of a posted rule, flew 
into his eyes. Defendant bus company, whose driver had ignored the plaintiff's protests, was 
held liable. 
21 U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM. TO 
THE SURGEON GENERAL 349-54 (1964) . 
• 1 E.M. BRECHER, LicIT AND ILLICIT DRUGS: THE CONSUMERS UNION REPORT 220-28 (1972). 
" We may not penalize someone merely for being an addict. Robinson v. California, 370 
U.S. 660 (1962). Commentators have suggested that the exculpation of the addict should 
extend to such addiction-related behavior as "nontrafficking use, possession, and purchase 
of the drug." Fingarette, Addiction and Criminal Responsibility, 84 YALE L. J. 413, 415 n.11 
(1975). Such extension of the Robinson holding has not been generally accepted by the courts. 
Annot: Drug Addiction or Related Mental State as Defense to Criminal Charges, 73 A.L.R.3d 
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be called involuntary. At any particular time, the smoker must be 
regarded as having the power to choose whether to smoke or not. 
However, an understanding of the need to smoke is necessary both 
for a legislative judgment about how, if at all, to protect nonsmok-
ers, and for a proper analysis of the enforceability of smoking restric-
tions and prohibitions. 
C. The Right to Breathe Clean Air Versus the Right to Smoke 
The "nonsmokers' rights" movement takes the position that the 
right to breathe clean air should supersede the right to smoke when 
the two conflict.24 This position seems to be based partly on the 
premise that the right to indulge in an optional pleasure should be 
conditioned upon non-interference with the health, safety, and com-
fort of other persons. Although splOking should not be regarded as 
mere indulgence in an optional pleasure, nonsmokers would argue, 
that at any given time and place the smoker has a choice whether 
to smoke or not, while the nonsmoker has no choice about breathing 
16, 35 (1976). Theories of addict exculpation are based upon premises of an overpowering 
compulsion equivalent to insanity, 73 A.L.R.3d 16, 22 (1976), or on intoxication "severe 
enough to affect the individual's reception of reality or control over his will." Annot: Effect 
of Voluntary Drug Intoxication Upon Criminal Responsibility, 73 A.L.R.3d 98, 104 (1976). 
Neither of these premises is applicable to the tobacco smoker. Some smokers may sometimes 
light up "absent-mindedly" or "subconsciously." U.S. PUBlJC HEALTH SERVICE, supra note 21, 
at 352. Smoking in a no-smoking area, however, is malum prohibitum rather than malum in 
se, and as such would not be excused for lack of criminal intent, anymore than would absent-
mindedly exceeding a highway speed limit. Such "subconscious" behavior might, however, 
be considered an additional reason for making a prior request to stop smoking an element of 
the smoking offense. See note 98, infra, and accompanying text. The validity of restricting 
smoking for the prevention of fire has been universally accepted, apparently without chal-
lenge. (In Commonwealth v. Thompson, 53 Mass. (12 Metc.) 231 (1847), a prohibition on 
smoking in the streets and passageways of Boston was held applicable to de facto as well as 
de jure public ways.) Restriction of smoking for prevention of air pollution has been judicially 
sustained. See notes 61 and 62, infra, and accompanying text. 
2' Schmidt, The U.S. Experience in Nonsmokers' Rights, 61 AMER. LUNG ASS'N BULL. (no. 
10) 11, 15 (Dec. 1975); Non-Smoker's Bill of Rights (National Interagency Council on Smok-
ing & Health, 419 Park Ave. So., Rm. 1301, New York, NY 10016). Some support for this 
position may be found in the legal concepts of personal liberty and privacy. "No right is held 
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every 
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interfer-
ence of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Union Pacific Ry. Co. 
v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). "The right of personal privacy could also extend to 
protect an individual's decision regarding what he will or will not ingest into his body." Minn. 
St. Bd. of Health v. City of Brainerd, 241 N.W.2d 624, 631 (Minn. 1976). Rights of ingestion 
or non-ingestion, then, may be considered superior to rights of emission, at least when the 
two conflict. Even considering that smoking, from the viewpoint of the smoker, is primarily 
an act of ingestion, it is unavoidably also an act of emission. 
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the air. Thus, when the smoker wants to smoke, he should remove 
himself temporarily to a place where his smoking will not cause a 
pollution problem. On the other hand, the smoker might ask, why 
should he rather than the nonsmoker be required to move, when 
both have an equal right to be in the same place? The nonsmoker 
might respond with two reasons: first, because the pollutant effects 
of the smoking will last longer than the smoking itself; and second, 
because the inconvenience to the nonsmoker of moving each time 
any smoker wants to smoke is greater than the inconvenience to the 
individual smoker of moving when he wants to smoke. Note that we 
are now no longer dealing with a question of the rights of one indi-
vidual vis-a-vis those of another, but rather with the typical social 
situation of multiple individuals, wherein the temporal and spatial 
distribution of smoking behavior is more or less random. 
What about the situation where it is not merely inconvenient, but 
practically impossible for the smoker to leave a place in order to 
smoke-for example, the long-distance airplane trip? How are we to 
weigh the suffering of the smoker who is not allowed to smoke 
against that of the nonsmoker who must breathe polluted air? It is 
fruitless to argue about whose right is superior in such a situation. 
The only fair solution is one which provides both clean air for the 
nonsmokers and an opportunity to smoke for the smokers, and this 
can be done only by modifying the random distribution of smoking 
behavior; that is, by segregating such behavior (generally spatially 
but conceivably temporally). Such segregation is essentially a legis-
lative solution. 
III. JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR SMOKING POLLUTION 
A. A Constitutional Right to Be Free from Tobacco Smoke? 
The arguments for a constitutional right to be free from tobacco 
smoke are similar to those for constitutional protection of the envi-
ronment in general. A constitutional guarantee of a decent environ-
ment has been sought as a fundamental right under the Ninth 
Amendment,25 and as an aspect of the guarantees of "life" and 
"liberty" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 28 These ar-
,. The Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: "The enumeration in the Consti-
tution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people." 
" See generally Beckman, The Right to a Decent Environment under the Ninth 
Amendment, 46 Los ANGELES BAR BULL. 4 (1971); Comment, The Continuing Search for a 
Constitu!ionally Protected Environment, 4 ENV. AFF. 515 (1975). 
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guments, however, have fared ill in the courts, and constitutional 
protection of the environment has not been established.27 One rea-
son given for the courts' reluctance has been that environmental 
problems involve complex tradeoffs which are best decided by legis-
lative bodies.28 Even if constitutional protection were established, a 
plaintiff seeking to invoke it would still face the hurdle of establish-
ing that there had been state action depriving him of the constitu-
tional right. Failure by the state to regtJate smoking might not be 
considered state action. 29 
In the one case which has specifically considered the question, 
Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District,30 the exist-
ence of a constitutional right to be free from tobacco smoke was 
denied. The plaintiffs in Gasper brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 198331 to enjoin the defendant from allowing smoking in the Louis-
iana Superdome, a state-owned multipurpose enclosed arena. Plain-
tiffs alleged three violations of their constitutional rights: (1) a chill-
ing effect on the exercise of peripheral First Amendment rights to 
receive others' thoughts and ideas; (2) a deprivation of life, liberty, 
and property without due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments; and (3) a violation of a fundamental 
right to breathe clean air as protected by the Ninth Amendment. 
In support of their First Amendment claim, plaintiffs cited 
Lamont v. Postmaster General of United States,32 which held that 
the receipt of communist propaganda through the mails could not 
be made conditional upon a written statement evidencing the recip-
ients' desire for such material. The Gasper court responded in these 
terms: 
Unlike the Lamont case, the instant case contains no facts even re-
motely indicating an attempt by the State of Louisiana to restrict any-
one's right to receive information or entertainment. Other than making 
periodic requests that patrons of the Louisiana Superdome voluntarily 
refrain from smoking, the State has adhered to the tenet of not interfer-
'n See, e.g., Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971) . 
.. See Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 536 (S.D. Tex. 1972) . 
.. In Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp., 1 E.R.C. 1640 (D. Mont. 
1970), the court recognized the right to a decent environment, but held that failure of the 
state to abate pollution from a state-licensed facility did not constitute state action. However, 
acts of omission have been held to constitute a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 
Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382, 1387 (6th Cir. 1972). 
311 418 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. La. 1976). 
31 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides for a civil action for deprivation ofrights. 
32 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
352 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 6:345 
ing with the manner in which spectators watch events for which they 
have paid.33 
The court thus seems to have distinguished Lamont on the basis of 
the Postmaster General's chilling intent to control the receipt of 
ideas, as opposed to the lack of any such intent on the part of the 
State of Louisiana. Intent, however, is not a necessary element of a 
cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §1983.34 As to the actual chilling 
effect of the state's policy, the Gasper court said: 
To say that allowing smoking in the Louisiana Superdome creates a 
chilling effect upon the exercise of one's First Amendment rights has no 
more merit than an argument alleging that admission fees charged at 
such events have a chilling effect upon the exercise of such rights, or that 
the selling of beer violates First Amendment rights of those who refuse 
to attend events where alcoholic beverages are sold. This Court is of the 
opinion that the State's permissive attitude toward smoking in the 
Louisiana Superdome adequately preserves the delicate balance of indi-
vidual rights without yielding to the temptation to intervene in purely 
private affairs.35 
The court's reasoning here is questionable. Unreasonably high ad-
mission fees might create a chilling effect on First Amendment 
rights. One may ask what is meant by "purely private affairs." The 
drinking of beer in moderation has no direct physical effect on per-
sons other than the drinker. Other persons' moral reactions to such 
drinking would indeed be their purely private affairs. Uncontrolled 
smoking in an enclosed arena, in contrast, has a physical effect on 
the air breathed by all persons present. Just as fees should be kept 
reasonable, and persons who are obnoxious from excessive drinking 
should be ushered out, so, too, should smoking be reasonably con-
trolled. 
In support of their due process claim, the plaintiffs relied on the 
Court of Appeals opinion in Pollak v. Public Utilities Commission 
of District of Columbia,38 which held that a transit company with a 
federally-granted monopoly which was forcing passengers on its 
buses and streetcars to listen to allegedly obnoxious broadcasting 
was violating their Fifth Amendment right to liberty. The Supreme 
Court reversed the Court of Appeals on the grounds that the inter-
33 418 F. Supp. at 718. 
34 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). 
35 418 F. Supp. at 718. 
31 191 F.2d 450 (1951), reu'd, 343 U.S. 451 (1952). 
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ference in question was not unreasonableY 
The Gasper court distinguished the Pollak case In two grounds: 
(1) the transit company's own broadcasting, rather than its policy 
toward the playing of radios by individual passengers, was in ques-
tion; and (2) the passengers had no choice whether to use the transit 
vehicles, whereas "those who attend events in the Louisiana Super-
dome are in no way compelled to use the facility."38 One commenta-
tor has criticized this portion of the Gasper opinion as unresponsive 
to the plaintiffs' meritorious contention that the right to be free 
from forced breathing of smoke filled air is analogous to the right 
to be free from forced listening to radio broadcasts, which was recog-
nized by the Supreme Court in the Pollak case, and that the impor-
tant question in each case is the reasonableness of the interference 
with each right. 39 However, the Gasper court went on to cite Tanner 
v. Armco Steel Corporation40 for the proposition that there is no 
constitutional guarantee of a healthful environment, and that the 
resolution of environmental problems is better left to the workings 
of the legislatures. 
In dismissing the Ninth Amendment claim the court cited other 
cases denying constitutional protection for the environment41 and 
stated that to recognize a fundamental right to be free from ciga-
rette smoke "would be to mock the lofty purposes" of the Constitu-
tion.42 
In sum, the recurrent thrusts of the Gasper opinion are that to-
bacco pollution is not a problem of "constitutional proportions," 
and that, like other environmental concerns, its solution is best left 
to legislative fiat. 
There is considerable merit in the latter conclusion. Even if a 
constitutional right to a healthful environment were recognized by 
the courts, or added by amendment, as it has been in some state 
constitutions,43 it would be a difficult right to enforce solely by judi-
37 343 u.s. at 465. 
38 418 F. Supp. at 720. 
" Kaufman, Where There's Smoke There's Ire: The Search for Legal Paths to Tobacco-
Free Air, 3 COLUM. J. ENv. L. 62, 78-79 (1976) . 
•• 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972). 
" E.g., Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps 
of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1970). 
" Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District, 418 F. Supp. 716, 721 (E.D. La. 
1976) . 
., E.g., Ill. Const. Art. XI, § 1 provides: "The public policy of the State and the duty of 
each person is to provide and maintain a healthful environment for the benefi~ ?f this and 
future generations." For discussion of this provision, see Vuich, Toward Recognttwn of Non-
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cial action. Asking a court to remedy a state's failure to regulate 
smoking is essentially asking the court to legislate. The multiplicity 
of situations in which smoking creates an air pollution problem 
underscores the advantages of a legislative, rather than a judicial, 
resolution to the problem. 
B. Smoking As a Nuisance 
It is well settled that a property interest carries with it a right to 
clean air, a right which can be enforced against a nuisance consist-
ing of smoke alone. 44 The common areas of a condominium, for 
example, might present an area in which persons with the requisite 
property interest could utilize the common law action of nuisance 
to remedy a smoking pollution problem. Suit could be brought 
against the condominium association if its rules permit a smoking 
nuisance. 45 To constitute an actionable nuisance, the smoking pollu-
tion would have to be annoying to the ordinary person, not just to 
the hypersensitive, allergic, or ill person;48 it could, however, be a 
nuisance even though it occurs only intermittently,41 
Smoking might also come within certain statutory definitions of 
public nuisance. For example, the California Penal Code provides 
that "(a)nything which is injurious to health, or ... offensive to the 
senses ... so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life 
. . . by any considerable number of persons . . . is a public nuis-
ance."48 Employees of the Los Angeles City Hall Complex have 
petitioned to have smoking there declared a public nuisance under 
this statute. 49 
The power of bringing an action to abate a public nuisance lies 
primarily with the government. Generally, an individual suffering 
injury which is common to the general public has no cause of ac-
smokers' Rights in Illinois, 5 Loy. CH. L.J. 610, 616 (1974). See also Howard, State Constitu-
tions and the Environment, 58 VA. L. REv. 193 (1972) . 
.. Annat.: Nuisance Resulting from Smoke Alone as Subject for Injunctive Relief, 6 A.L.R. 
1575 (1920) . 
.. Alpern v. Goldsmith (Sup. Ct. Nassau County), 166 N.Y.L.J. no. 86, Nov. 4, 1971, at 
18, col. 5, while finding that the provision of places for the accumulation of pet wastes was 
within the powers of the condominium association, said "plaintiff may be able to establish 
that such provision ... at a particular location and manner of use may constitute a common 
nuisance." 
.. See Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, 104 N.E. 371 (1914) . 
., See Ross v. Butler, 19 N.J. Eq. 294, 302 (1868). 
" CAL. PENAL CODE § 370 (West 1970) . 
.. ACTION ON SMOKING & HEALTH, DIGEST OF NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS LEGISLATION 21 (Dec. 20, 
1976). 
- --------------
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tion.50 The individual may complain or petition, but there remains 
an element of the state's prosecutorial discretion, which may limit 
the effectiveness of the public nuisance approach to the smoking 
problem. It might also be hard to establish that the pollution caused 
by smoking in a particular place was of such degree as to constitute 
an actionable nuisance, unless there is a statutory prohibition of 
smoking in that place.51 
C. Smoking as a Battery 
Battery is usually defined as an intended harmful or offensive 
touching of another person. Indirect as well as direct touching may 
constitute a battery.52 
Blowing smoke in another's face might well be a battery; spitting 
in someone's face certainly is.53 Merely smoking in proximity to a 
person known by the smoker to be allergic to tobacco smoke, with 
the intent and result of discomforting that person, could be consid-
ered battery. In a pending suit on this theory, an employee is seek-
ing actual and punitive damages from his cigar-smoking supervi-
sor. 54 This remedy, however, would not have widespread application 
in combatting smoking pollution, since most smoking is done to 
satisfy the smoker, with no intent to harm others.55 
D. Common Law Right to a Smoke-Free Workplace 
Smoking pollution is an especially acute problem in places of 
employment because of the long periods of time which persons must 
spend there. A recent case, Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone 
Company,56 placed upon an employer a duty to restrict his employ-
ees' smoking. The plaintiff in this case was an office worker with a 
severe allergy to cigarette smoke. Smoking by her fellow employees 
50 See generally Comment, The Common Law of Public Nuisance in State Environmental 
Litigation, 4 ENV. AFF. 367 (1975); Rothstein, Private Actions for Public Nuisance: The 
Standing Problem, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 453 (1974). 
51 See Kaufman, supra note 38, at 82-86. 
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18; W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 35 (4th ed. 1971). 
" Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450, 21 N.W. 527 (1884). 
54 McCracken v. Sloan, N.C. Super. Ct., Mecklenburg County, No. 75-4270 (attorney for 
plaintiff, James C. Fuller, Jr., Charlotte, N.C.). 
55 For further discussion of this question see Kaufman, supra note 38, at 86-89. 
51 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (Ch. Div., 1976). For pleadings, transcripts, affidavits 
and other related materials see D. SWMP, A. BLUMROSEN & S. FINIFTER, How To PROTECT YOUR 
HEALTH AT WORK (1976), available from, National Interagency Council on Smoking & Health, 
419 Park Ave., New York, N.Y. 10016. 
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was making her so sick that she frequently had to leave work. She 
brought an action seeking an injunction to prohibit smoking in her 
work area. The court granted injunctive relief, basing its decision 
on the common law right to a safe workplace and on a finding that 
cigarette smoke was a hazardous substance which was not a neces-
sary by-product of the defendant's business. 
In taking judicial notice of the toxic nature of tobacco smoke, the 
court used language indicating that the severity of the plaintiff's 
allergy may not have been a necessary factor in reaching its deci-
sion. To the extent this proves true, the Shimp doctrine may have 
broad application. The court stated: 
Cigarette smoke contaminates and pollutes the air, creating a health 
hazard not merely to the smoker but to all those around her who must 
rely upon the same air supply. The right of an individual to risk his or 
her own health does not include the right to jeopardize the health of 
those who must remain around him or her in order to properly perform 
the duties of their jobs. The portion of the population which is especially 
sensitive to cigarette smoke is so significant that it is reasonable to 
expect an employer to foresee health consequences and to impose upon 
him a duty to abate the hazard which causes discomfortY 
The common law duty of the employer to exercise reasonable care 
in providing a safe place of work is a basic and well recognized one 
which includes a corollary duty to make and enforce rules for the 
conduct of employees designed to make the workplace safe.58 The 
Shimp case establishes in New Jersey a right to a workplace free of 
tobacco smoke based upon this duty, though it is conceivable that 
further decisions might limit the Shimp holding to office workers or 
to persons with severe allergic reaction to tobacco smoke. For the 
Shimp doctrine to be extended beyond New Jersey, however, other 
courts not only will need to agree that tobacco smoke is an unneces-
sary hazard, 59 but also will need to be willing to exercise equitable 
51 145 N.J. Super. at 529-30,368 A.2d at 415-16. 
58 W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 526 (4th ed. 1971); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 492. 
" The question whether smoking is properly considered part of an employee's work has 
been answered affirmatively in cases holding that employees injured through smoking are 
entitled to workmen's compensation. See Annot: Workmen's Compensation: Compensation 
to Workmen Injured through Smoking, 5 A.L.R. 1521 (1920). To quote one such case: "We 
have the tobacco habit with us, and we must deal with it as it is. . . . Tobacco is universally 
recognized to be a solace to him who uses it, and it may be that such a one, unless he finally 
shakes off the habit, cannot perform the labors of his life as well without it as with it." 
Whiting-Mead Commercial Company v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 178 Cal. 505-08, 173 
P. 1105-06, 5 A.L.R. 1518, 1520-21 (1918). The status of smoking in employment has also 
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powers to enjoin such hazards. Eliminating smoking pollution in 
workplaces by lawsuits alone would be an interminable and costly 
endeavor. Legislation, by comparison, could take giant steps toward 
an equitable solution. 
IV. EFFECTIVE LEGISLATION AS A SOLUTION 
A. Appropriateness and Validity of Smoking Pollution Legislation 
Legislative enactments offer more comprehensive protection and 
more effective enforcement than do judicial remedies for nonsmok-
ers. Indeed, a legislative solution seems particularly appropriate 
since the problem of pollution due to smoking goes beyond the 
bounds of a conflict between smokers and nonsmokers: air pollution 
hurts everyone. Even smokers, although accepting the ill effects of 
their own mainstream smoke, may not bargain on additional harm 
from the sidestream smoke of others. In fact, a significant number 
of smokers agree that it is annoying to be near someone who is 
smoking, and a significant number of smokers favor further restric-
tions on smoking.80 
Anti -smoking statutes are designed to keep the air clean for peo-
ple to breathe, and are therefore a valid exercise of the state's police 
power.81 For example, a Louisiana prohibition of smoking in street-
cars was upheld on this ground in State v. Heidenhaim,82 where the 
court found that "smoking in the streetcars . . . caused to a great 
majority of the people using them material annoyance, inconveni-
ence and discomfort. This is particularly so in the winter season, 
when the cars are closed. There is not only discomfort, but positive 
danger to health, from the contaminated air."83 The extent of the 
restriction on smoking, however, must bear some reasonable rela-
tion to the statute's purpose. An ordinance forbidding cigarette 
smoking within corporate limits was struck down as an unreason-
able invasion of personal liberty in Hershberg v. City of 
arisen in connection with the question of the employer's liability for damages due to his 
employee's smoking, upon which there has been a division of cases. See Annot: Liability of 
Master for Damage to Person or Property Due to Servant's Smoking, 13 A.L.R. 997 (1921), 
and Supp. 31 A.L.R. 294 (1924). The relevance of these cases to the Shimp doctrine is 
dubious, since they did not involve any consideration of the air pollutant nature of smoking . 
.. U.S. NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR SMOKING AND HEALTH, ADULT USE OF TOBACCO 1970, 
at n-17 to n-20 (1973); see also Turbeville, An Attitudinal Study of Smoking Etiquette, 19 
PROCEEDINGS OF SOUTHWESTERN SOCIOLOGICAL ASS'N 149 (1968). 
" Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960) . 
• z 42 La. Ann. 483, 7 So. 621 (1890) . 
.. 42 La. Ann. at 486, 7 So. at 621. 
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Barbourville. 64 An ordinance prohibiting all public smoking was 
voided in City of Zion v. Behrens, 65 because the streets were so wide 
and the parks so large that the prohibition could not be justified on 
the grounds of either prevention of fire or prevention of annoyance 
to other persons, even though the court recognized that "tobacco 
smoke is offensive to many persons and in exceptional cases harmful 
to some, "88 and, that "power exists to prohibit smoking in certain 
public places ... where large numbers of persons are crowded to-
gether in a small place."67 Because of the toxic nature of tobacco 
smoke it is likely that regulation of smoking would be valid in al-
most any enclosed public place (and perhaps in some outdoor situa-
tions where people must stand in line or sit near one another). 
B. The Segregation of Smoking 
Smoking regulation need not consist of total smoking prohibition. 
In many places it is possible to keep the nonsmokers' air clean by 
establishing smoking and no-smoking areas. A statute which flatly 
prohibits smoking in a wide range of enclosed public places without 
making any provision for the establishment of smoking and no-
smoking areas where feasible might be attacked as an unnecessary 
restriction of personal liberty. Conversely, since concentration of 
smokers in certain areas would increase their exposure to pollutants, 
a legislative decision favoring total prohibition as the lesser evil 
might be sustained, especially if the declared purpose of the statute 
was the prevention of air pollution rather than the protection of 
nonsmokers only. Still, the segregation method seems preferable: it 
allows smokers to carry out the behavior so important to them; it 
cares for the interests of nonsmokers; and it will be easier to enforce 
than a total ban. 
Given the general concept of smoking and no-smoking areas, 
questions arise concerning the quantitative and qualitative equality 
of facilities. To establish physically separate smoking areas which 
allow no seepage of smoke into the no-smoking area, the fairest 
provision seems to be that the sizes of the areas should, as nearly 
as practical, be in the same ratio as are the numbers of smokers to 
nonsmokers. When the areas are not physically separated, the 
" 142 Ky. 60, 133 S.W. 985 (1911). 
" 262 Ill. 510, 104 N.E. 836 (1914) . 
.. 262 Ill. at 511, 104 N.E. at 837. 
" 262 Ill. at 512, 104 N.E. at 837. 
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smokers pollute a larger area than they occupy, and so the no-
smoking area must be large enough that the most sensitive non-
smokers can occupy portions remote from the smoking area while 
the least sensitive nonsmokers can occupy a buffer zone along the 
boundary of the smoking area. Many places will be too small to be 
effectively divided into smoking and no-smoking areas. A smoking 
area should not include unique portions of a place which all persons 
may need to visit or pass through-for example, bookstack areas of 
a library, display areas of a museum, exit and entrance areas, and 
toilet facilities. 
Several recent state statutes fail to place any upper limit on the 
permissible size of a smoking area, thus leaving open the possibility 
that the no-smoking area will be inadequate.a8 Other regulatory 
schemes have addressed the question of the relative size of these 
areas. For example, the regulations implementing the Minnesota 
Clean Indoor Air Act8• provide that "the size of the designated 
smoking-permitted area shall not be more than proportionate to the 
preference of users of that location."70 Similarly, Civil Aeronautics 
Board (CAB) regulations require no-smoking areas on passenger 
aircraft to be large enough to accommodate the demand for them.71 
Both the Minnesota and the CAB regulations leave open the possi-
bility of a smoking area inadequate to accommodate all those who 
wish to smoke, thus reflecting either a judgment that it is more 
important to protect nonsmokers than to provide for the needs of 
smokers, a concern for allowing a buffer zone, or a judgment that 
the proprietor of a place should not be required to allow smoking to 
a greater degree than he might desire. 
C. Federal Power to Regulate Smoking 
The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce includes 
the power to regulate intrastate activity if the activity in question 
.. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 36-601.01 (1974); 1975 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 310; MASS. ANN. LAWS 
ch. 470, § 21 (1975); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1031, as amended, 1975 Neb. Laws ch. 75; S. D. 
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-36-2 (Supp. 1975); TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 48.01 (Vernon 
Supp. 1975). 
II MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.411-.417 (1975). 
7. MINN. DEPT. OF HEALTH RULES ch. 26, MHD 443(b)(4) (Apr. 2, 1976). Ct., MINN. DEPT. 
OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY RULES GoVERNING SMOKING IN FACTORIES, WAREHOUSES & SIMILAR 
PLACES OF WORK, LICA 4(a) (Apr. 2, 1976), which make a similar provision for employee 
eating and rest areas. 
71 14 C.F.R. § 252.2 (1976). 
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has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.72 For example, Con-
gress could regulate smoking in hotels and motels73 and most res-
taurants74 on the grounds that smoking pollution could have a tend-
ency to deter interstate travelers from using such places. 
It has been suggested75 that we need a federal "clean indoor air 
act," modeled after the Clean Air Act,78 to prevent indoor pollution 
from smoking, heating and cooking. Federal standards promulgated 
under this act could be reached through state implementation plans 
stressing solutions through building design. 
However, the intergovernmental complexities and delays asso-
ciated with the Clean Air Act are neither appropriate nor necessary 
to deal with that portion of indoor air pollution which results from 
smoking. The primary responsibility for the control of localized air 
pollution rests with the states.77 The federal government lacks the 
enforcement machinery to deal with behavior as widespread yet 
localized as smoking, and would have to depend on state and local 
enforcement. Moreover, doubt has recently been cast upon the 
power of the federal government to require specific state implemen-
tation action. 78 For these reasons federal regulation of smoking 
should be confined to federal facilities and interstate passenger car-
rier facilities. 79 
72 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
73 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
" See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
,. Doggett & Friedman, Legislation for Clean Air: An Indoor Front, 82 YALE L.J. 1040, 1050 
(1973). 
,. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (Supp. II 1972), as amended, PUB. L. No. 95-95, _ Stat. _ 
(1977). 
77 Houston Compressed Steel Corp. v. State, 456 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970); 42 
U.S.C. § 1857(a)(3). 
-, 78 The Clean Air Act was held not to authorize the imposition of sanctions on a state or its 
officials for failure to comply with federal regulations directing the state to adopt certain 
pollution control plans in Brown v. Environmental Protection Agency, 521 F.2d 827,31 A.L.R. 
Fed. 57, 63 (9th Cir. 1975); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975); and 
Maryland v. Environmental Protection Agency, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975). All three cases 
were vacated in Environmental Protection Agency v. Brown, 97 S. Ct. 1635 (1977), because 
of a statement by the government that the requirements for state promulgation of regulations 
would be eliminated from the proposed pollution control plans. However, the Third Circuit 
has upheld the application of these sanctions on a state as a valid exercise of the commerce 
power. Pennsylvania v. Environmental Protection Agency, 500 F.2d 246, 259 (3d Cir. 1974). 
71 E.g., H.R. REp. No. 862, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976) (Rep. Drinan's proposed "Federal 
Nonsmokers' Protection Act"). 
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D. Elements of a Smoking Pollution Prevention Act 
1. Effective Segregation of Smoking 
361 
As already noted, a no-smoking area, to be effective, must either 
be physically separated from the smoking area or be of sufficient 
size to provide a buffer zone. It is possible to set forth detailed 
criteria as to what constitutes physical separation, maximum ac-
ceptable pollutant levels, minimum acceptable sizes of no-smoking 
areas, and adequate ventilation.80 It is also possible to require sim-
ply that any smoking area be of such size and location that the drift 
of smoke into the no-smoking area is minimized,81 or, more strictly, 
that designation of a smoking area be allowed only where it is possi-
ble to prevent any pollutant effects in the no-smoking area.82 
HO MINN. DEPT. OF HEALTII RULES ch. 26, MHO 442 (a)(2) (Apr. 2, 1976), states four criteria, 
anyone of which will suffice to make a no-smoking area into an "acceptable smoke-free area": 
(1) separation from the smoking area by a wall at least 56 inches high, (2) separation from 
the smoking area by a space at least 4 ft. wide, (3) ventilation providing at least six air 
changes per hour, or (4) CO concentration not to exceed that of outside air by more than 9 
ppm. Although these criteria are phrased in the alternative, MHD 445(b)(2) provides that 
the CO standard shall not be exceeded even when application of the Act is otherwise stated. 
SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CALIF. CODE OF REGULATORY ORDINANCES § 32.808 (Ordinance 4556 n.s., 
Aug. 19, 1975), provides that smoking areas can be established in rooms with ventilation 
providing an outdoor air change of at least 25 cu. ft. per minute per occupant or 80% efficient 
filtration of the whole air content of the room at least every 15 minutes; smoking areas in 
such rooms are not to exceed 50% ofseating capacity. The provision does not apply to certain 
kinds of places where smoking is abolutely prohibited. 
One study of the irritant effects of tobacco smoke found that 4.7 mg/m3 of particulates was 
a threshold value for unpleasantness for nonsmokers, that 9 mg/m3.caused eye irritation on 
both smokers and nonsmokers, and that a ventilation rate of 12 m3/hr per cigarette was 
required to avoid eye irritation, while the prevention of unpleasant odors required a ventila-
tion rate of 50 m3/hr per cigarette. U.S. CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, THE HEALTH CONSE-
QUENCES OF SMOKING 99 (1975). 
HI H.R. REP. No. 862, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976), would require the separation of smoking 
and no-smoking areas "in a manner which minimizes, to the extent practicable, the drift of 
smoke from the smoking area into the nonsmoking area." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.415 (West 
1975), provides that "where smoking areas are designated, existing physical barriers and 
ventilation systems shall be used to minimize the toxic effect of smoke on adjacent non-
smoking areas." 
.. NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.249 (1975) allows designated smoking areas "where it is possible 
to confine the smoke to such areas." FT. LAUDERDALE, FLA. CODE § 28-80 (Ordinance C-75-6, 
Mar. 4, 1975) provides that smoking areas must be approved by the county health director 
as creating "no substantial health hazard to nonsmokers." WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 248-152 
(1975) requires that smoking areas in public conveyances and libraries be "of such size and 
location as will insure the provision of a substantially smoke-free atmosphere" in the convey-
ance or library as a whole. 
362 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 6:345 
2. Extent of Coverage 
The types of enclosed places in which the restriction of smoking 
is desirable are so diverse that statutory enumeration of them seems 
advisable. The places in which it is most important to establish 
smoking and no-smoking areas are those where people must remain 
for relatively long periods of time; for example, long-distance public 
transportation, public meeting or hearing rooms, welfare offices, 
courtrooms, legislative chambers, hospitals, prisons, and work-
places. In places where people generally make short visits, such as 
post offices and polling places, smoking should be flatly prohibited, 
on the theory that the immediate pollutant effects are a worse evil 
than the short delay in satisfaction of the smoking urge. Health care 
waiting rooms are a particularly important place in which to pro-
hibit smoking, due to the substantial likelihood that some persons 
present will be suffering from a respiratory or other ailment render-
ing them especially susceptible to the harmful effects of smoke. In 
hospitals, prisons, and similar institutions, it should be possible to 
avoid putting smokers and nonsmokers together in the same room, 
cell, or end of a ward, except in short-term emergency situations. 
In common areas of such facilities, such as hallways, eating areas, 
lounges, and waiting rooms, smoking should be prohibited except 
where it can be effectively segregated. 
Places of work present particularly difficult areas for smoking 
regulation. Only the Minnesota and Utah Clean Indoor Air Acts, the 
broadest of such laws to date, attempt to restrict it. The general 
prohibition in the Minnesota Act is that "No person shall smoke in 
a public place or at public meeting except in designated smoking 
areas,"83 and "public place" is defined as "any enclosed, indoor area 
used by the general public or serving as a place of work, including, 
but not limited to. . . offices and other commercial establishments, 
... but excluding private, enclosed offices occupied exclusively by 
smokers even though such offices may be visited by nonsmokers. "84 
This general prohibition, however, "shall not apply to factories, 
warehouses and similar places of work not usually frequented by the 
general public, except that the department of labor and industry 
shall, in consultation with the state board of health, establish rules 
to restrict or prohibit smoking in those places of work where the 
.. MINN. STAT. ANN. §l44.414 (1975). 
" [d. at §l44.413, sub. 2 (1975). 
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close proximity of workers or the inadequacy of ventilation causes 
smoke pollution detrimental to the health and comfort of nonsmok-
ing employees."85 The Department of Labor and Industry rules pro-
mulgated under the Minnesota Act require no-smoking space in 
employee eating and rest areas and segregation of smoking in work 
areas "to the extent possible without unreasonable interference with 
the business operation."86 According to the Association for Non-
smokers' Rights, "[m]ost employers have resisted implementation 
of the law. "87 
Certain places will require exceptions to the general statutory 
scheme requiring segregation or prohibition of smoking. For exam-
ple, in small public conveyances such as taxis, limousines, and jit-
neys, the rule could be that smoking would be permitted only when 
the operator and all the passengers consent.88 Further, it is neither 
necessary nor desirable to legislate concerning smoking in places of 
religious meeting. Tradition and religious authority are usually suf-
ficient to restrict smoking in those places, and a smoking prohibi-
tion in this context might be considered an interference with the 
exercise of religion.89 
Restaurants and other public eating places present a special area 
for conflict between smokers and nonsmokers. Many smokers find 
mealtime a desirable time to smoke, while many nonsmokers find 
that tobacco smoke spoils their enjoyment of a meal. Restaurant 
owners have resisted smoking restrictions,90 presumably from fear of 
losing their smoking customers (many bars and small diners have a 
" [d. at §144.414 (1975). The Utah statute is somewhat more strongly worded: 
This prohibition shall apply also to offices, shops, warehouses, factories, mines, and simi-
lar places of employment not usually frequented by the general public; for such places 
local boards of health shall establish rules to restrict or prohibit smoking in those places 
of work where the proximity of workers or the inadequacy of ventilation causes smoke 
pollution detrimental to the health or comfort of nonsmoking employees. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-106 (1976) (emphasis added). 
HI MINN. DEPT. OF LABOR & INDUSTRY RULES GOVERNING SMOKING IN FACTORIES, WAREHOUSES, 
& SIMILAR PLACES OF WORK, LICA 1-5 (Apr. 2, 1976). 
" Information from Association for Nonsmokers Rights, 61 Portland Ave., St. Paul, Minn. 
55102. 
os MINN. DEPT. OF HEALTH RULES ch. 26, MHD 444(e) (Apr. 2, 1976) provides that a public 
conveyance with a capacity of fewer than ten persons may be entirely a smoking area if 
everyone expressly consents. 
HO See, e.g., United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 35 A.L.R.3d 922 (D.D.C. 1968) . 
.. The original Utah law requiring segregation of smoking in eating places (1921 Utah Sess. 
Laws ch. 145) was amended two years later to allow eating places to be declared smoking 
rooms in their entirety. 1923 Utah Sess. Laws ch. 52. The provision covering restaurants in 
the Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.413 (West 1975), has encoun-
tered organized resistance. Newsweek, Dec. 8, 1975, at 35. 
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high percentage of smoking patrons). For these establishments, a 
clean indoor air act might contain a provision that, in eating places 
which are too small to have effective smoking segregation, the pro-
prietor shall have the option of allowing smoki~g entirely or banning 
it entirely. 91 This approach would be an exception from the general 
statutory requirement that smoking be prohibited entirely in places 
where it cannot be effectively segregated. The rationale for this 
exception is that restaurants are relatively competitive, non-unique 
places, and that, for most people patronage is largely a matter of 
choice rather than necessity. 
A large class of nonsmokers exist who daily suffer from smokers' 
pollution yet have little or no power to speak up for their right to 
clean air. These are the young children of smoking parents. It has 
been found that the "children of parents who smoke are more likely 
to have bronchitis and pneumonia during the first year of life, and 
this is probably at least partly due to their being exposed to ciga-
rette smoke in the atmosphere."92 As a practical matter, it is un-
likely that this sort of parental behavior can be controlled by legisla-
tion. A state or federally-funded education effort aimed at getting 
smoking parents to restrict their smoking while near their children 
would be of more effect. 93 
3. Definition of the Smoking Offense 
Some statutory smoking restrictions mention cigarettes, cigars, 
and pipes without specifying that they contain tobacco.94 Others 
specify "tobacco in any form."95 In order to anticipate the legaliza-
tion of marihuana, the smoke of which contains some of the same 
toxic substances as those in tobacco smoke,98 and possible fads for 
smoking other substances, the offense should be defined so that it 
clearly includes the smoking of any substance.97 The possibility of 
II MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.415 (West 1975) provides that "no public place other than a bar 
shall be designated as a smoking area in its entirety." 
•• U.S. DEPT. OF H.E.W., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING 104, 110 (1975). 
93 SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CAllF. CODE OF REGULATORY ORDINANCES § 32.811 (Ordinance 4556 
n.s., Aug. 19, 1975) provides for "an annual program of educational activities emphasizing 
the social ramifications as well as the health-degrading aspects of smoking. " 
.. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-198 (1975), as amended, Pub. Act 73-90; DEL. CODE tit. ll, 
§ 1326 (Supp. 1975) . 
.. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 36-601.01 (1974); GA. CODE § 26-9910 (1975) . 
.. See note I, supra, at 19. 
17 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 823.12 (West Supp. 1975) prohibits the smoking of any substance in 
elevators. EL CAJON, CALIF. CITY CODE ch. laC (Ordinance 2879, Aug. 5, 1975) and SAN DIEGO 
--- --------
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new types of smoking devices can also be anticipated, as in the 
following definition from the Culver City, California ordinance: 
" 'Smoke' and 'smoking' are used here in the sense ordinarily asso-
ciated with the use of smoking tobacco and in addition shall mean 
the lighting of, or carrying lighted, tobacco or any other substance 
in a pipe, cigar, cigarette or other device used for smoking."98 Since 
smokers spend more time holding lighted cigarettes in their hands 
or in ashtrays than they do actually smoking them, the definition 
should also include that behavior.99 
In some circumstances it may be reasonable to discriminate be-
tween different forms of tobacco. For example, cigar-smoking could 
be prohibited entirely while cigarette smoking could be merely re-
stricted to a smoking area. In the alternative, a higher penalty 
might be attached to cigar and pipe smoking since cigars and pipes 
emit a larger volume of smoke than do cigarettes. Many people find 
the smell of cigars more objectionable than that of cigarettes or 
pipes, and cigar smoke has been found to contain a greater concen-
tration of carbon monoxide than does cigarette smoke. loo 
In some state statutes, the presence of a no-smoking sign or a 
request not to smoke by the person in charge is made a condition 
precedent of the smoking offense. 101 The apparent philosophy be-
hind such a provision is that it is not reasonable to assume public 
knowledge of the smoking prohibition in particular places. Signs, 
however, can disappear and persons in charge can be absent; thus, 
a personal request not to smoke should be a sufficient alternative 
to the presence of a sign. Moreover, in some classes of places, such 
as elevators, for which the prohibition would be absolute (because 
COUNTY, CALIF. CODE OF REGULATORY ORDINANCES §§ 32.801-.811 (Ordinance 4556 n.s., Aug. 
19, 1975) restrict the smoking of "tobacco or any other weed or plant." 
" CULVER CITY, CALIF. MUNIC. CODE § 23-55 (Ordinance CS-848, May 27, 1975) . 
.. An example of a poor definition is the following: "'smoking' means the igniting of any 
tobacco product followed by the drawing of the smoke caused by that ignition into the mouth 
of the person to be charged." N.D. CENTURY CODE 48-05-07 (Supp. 1975). 
100 U.S. DEPT OF H.E.W., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING 98 (1975); MISS. CODE § 
97-35-1 (1972) prohibits only cigar and pipe smoking on buses; the Civil Aeronautics Board 
has proposed a ban on cigar and pipe smoking in aircraft. 41 Fed. Reg. 44427 (1976). 
,., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21b (West Supp. 1976) (sign); TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN., tit. 
10, § 48.01 (Vernon Supp. 1975) (sign); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609. 605 (West Supp. 1976) (sign 
or request by operator of common carrier); MISS. CODE ANN. §87-35-1 (1972) (request by 
busdriver); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4951.57 (1953) (request by streetcar company employees); 
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 43A (Supp. 1974) (sign and request). Compare DULUTH, MINN. 
CITY CODE § 34-40 (Ordinance 8112, Nov. 12, 1974), which expressly states that non-existence 
of a sign is not a defense to a smoking violation charge. See also note 23, supra. 
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of the impossibility of segregating smoking within them), public 
knowledge of the law should be presumed. lo2 
4. Requirement of No-Smoking Signs and Extinguishment Facili-
ties 
Most laws prohibiting smoking in certain places require the post-
ing of no-smoking signs. lo3 Some specify the size of the letteringlO4 
or other characteristics of the sign. lo5 Since a broad smoking pollu-
tion prevention act deals with places which range in size from eleva-
tors to arenas, a convenient and reasonable criterion for the number 
and size of no-smoking signs would be that they be legible to persons 
of average vision throughout the no-smoking area and at all en-
trances thereto. lOft The requirement to post signs should carry with 
it the existence of a distinct offense for failure to post signs. Indeed, 
for purposes of determining a penalty, this offense might be consid-
ered more serious than the actual smoking offense, since it could 
lead to uncontrolled smoking. lo7 The unauthorized removal or de-
facement of signs should also be defined as a punishable offense. 
Facilities for the extinguishment of smoking substances should be 
required to be located at all entrances to a no-smoking area. Michi-
,02 SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CALIF. CODE OF REGULATORY ORDINANCES § 32.808 (b) (Ordinance 
4556 n.s., Aug. 19, 1975) prohibits smoking absolutely in elevators, indoor service lines, public 
transport facilities, and public restrooms. 
103 The Minnesota regulations provide for a mechanism in lieu of posting signs, whereby 
all persons entering a place are asked their preference for a smoking or no-smoking area and 
are directed to the appropriate one. MINN. DEPl'. OF HEALTH RULES ch. 26, MHD 443(d)(8) 
(Apr. 2, 1976). 
,0' CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21b (Supp. 1976) (4" high, strokes W' thick); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 21, § 1247 (West Supp. 1975) (I"); MINN. DEPl'. OF HEALTH RULES ch. 26, MHD 
443(d) (45) (1 W', except W' on tables or seats); id., MHD 443(d)(6) ("smoking permitted" 
signs shall not be larger than "no-smoking" signs in the same place). 
10. MD. DEPl'. OF LICENSING & REGULATION, Dlv. OF LABOR & INDUSTRY, RULES & REGULATIONS 
PROHIBITING SMOKING ON ELEVATORS, 2 Md. Reg. No. 26 (Nov. 12, 1975) reprinted in ACTION 
ON SMOKING & HEALTH, DIGEST OF STATE NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS LEGISLATION 25 (1976), specify 
that signs shall be red on white, made of wood, plastic or metal, and specify particular 
wording. 
, .. SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CAUF. CODE OF REGULATORY ORDINANCES § 32.806 (Ordinance 4556 
n.s., Aug. 19, 1975) provides that the manner of posting signs "including the wording, size, 
color, design, and place of posting" shall be at the discretion of the person in charge of the 
premises, "so long as clarity, sufficiency, and conspicuousness are apparent in communicat-
ing the intent" of the ordinance. 
'07 ALASKA STAT. § 18.35.350 (1975) provides a penalty of $10 to $100 for willful failure to 
display signs, compared with $5 to $25 for the smoking offense itself. 
'0' ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2433 (1974) provides a penalty of $10 for removal or 
defacement of signs, compared with a penalty of $5 for the smoking offense. 
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gan requires such receptacles outside elevators,109 and Texas makes 
the presence of extinguishment facilities an element of the smoking 
offense. 110 
5. Enforcement and Penalties 
Enforcement of a no-smoking rule often presents a considerable 
problem, especially after personal requests to the offender to cease 
smoking or to leave the no-smoking area are ignored. It should be 
made unlawful for the person in authority to permit smoking in a 
prohibited area. lll Since the meaning of the word "permit" may not 
be clear, a statute should state the duties of the person in charge 
explicitly.ll2 These should include the duty to personally request 
offenders to stop smoking, the duty to notify police if an offender 
persists in spite of such a request and perhaps the duty to refuse 
service to the offender until he stops smoking.ll3 
The smoking offense is most commonly classified as a misde-
meanor. A penalty common to several states is a fine between ten 
dollars and one hundred dollars.114 It might be preferable to make 
I.' MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.495(20) (1975). 
110 TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 48.01 (Vernon Supp. 1975). 
III DAVIS, CALIF. CITY CODE § 11-26 (Ordinance 657, Apr. 16, 1973); NORFOLK, VA. CODE § 
28-30. 
112 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144-416 (West Supp. 1976) requires the person in charge of a public 
place to "make reasonable efforts to prevent smoking in the public place by (a) posting 
appropriate signs; (b) arranging seating to provide a smoke-free area; (c) asking smokers to 
refrain from smoking upon request of a client or employee suffering discomfort from the 
smoke; or (d) any other means which may be appropriate." This duty of the person in charge 
can be enforced by injunction in an action brought by a board of health, or by any affected 
party. 
113 SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CALIF. CODE OF REGULATORY ORDINANCES § 32.810 (Ordinance 4556 
n.s., Aug. 19, 1975) makes it unlawful to serve a smoking offender. Other enforcement mea-
sures which might be appropriate in certain circumstances include eviction, citizen arrest, 
an actual extinguishment of the substance being smoked. 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-35-1(6) (1972) provides that a busdriver may evict a smoking passen-
ger, "using only such force as may be necessary," may "command the assistance of passen-
gers" for the eviction, and may cause the violator "to be detained and delivered to the proper 
authorities." In McQuerry v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 117 Mo. App. 255,92 S.W. 912 (1906), 
it was said that a streetcar passenger who persists in disregarding a smoking prohibition 
"after his attention is called to it, deserves expulsion from the car." 117 Mo. App. at 262, 92 
S.W. at 914. In New Jersey, a person smoking in a bus or in the no-smoking area of a train is 
a disorderly person (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-65 (West Supp. 1974), and as such is subject 
to citizen's arrest. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:169-3 (West 1953). 
"' ARIz. REV. STAT. § 36-601.01 (1974); GA. CODE § 26-9910 (1975); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-
1031 (1974), as amended, 1975 Neb. Sess. Laws ch. 75; NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.249 (1975); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 21, § 1247 (Supp. 1975); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-36-2 (Supp. 
1975). Imprisonment is possible in some states. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 43A (Supp. 1974) 
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the smoking offense a civil violation enforceable through the issu-
ance of summonses and payment of fines by mail. ll5 
6. Relation to Other State Legislation 
To avoid conflict with laws which restrict smoking for other pur-
poses, such as fire prevention, a state smoking pollution prevention 
act should disclaim any intent to allow smoking where it is other-
wise prohibited and should declare void any provision of any other 
law which would allow smoking in conflict with the smoking pollu-
tion prevention act. Further, the state statute should not prevent 
municipalities from adopting clean indoor air ordinances which take 
into account local circumstances, such as the desirability of restrict-
ing smoking in specific buildings. l1R 
V. CONCLUSION 
Tobacco smoke is air pollution. The right to be free from this 
pollution is judicially enforceable only in some situations; legisla-
tures, on the contrary, can deal comprehensively with the problem. 
Federal legislation restricting smoking in government buildings and 
in facilities directly serving interstate and foreign commerce is ad-
visable. Nevertheless, state smoking pollution prevention acts will 
provide a more comprehensive and enforceable solution. 
State smoking pollution statutes should require effective segrega-
tion of smoking, where possible, in waiting lines, workplaces, health 
care institutions, correctional facilities, and enclosed public places 
(including conveyances, waiting rooms, eating places, retail stores, 
service establishments, places of culture and entertainment, and 
places serving governmental functions). Where such segregation of 
smoking is not possible, the act would require prohibition of smok-
ing, except in eating places, where the proprietor would have the 
option of prohibiting or allowing smoking. The act would impose on 
those persons in charge of public places the duties to post no-
smoking signs, to provide extinguishment facilities, to request of-
($50 or ten days or both); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.495(20) (1975) ($50 or ninety days); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 609.605 (West Supp. 1976) ($100 or ninety days); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-35-1 
(1972) ($500 or thirty days or both). 
IJ5 ALASKA STAT. § 18.35.350 (1975) (civil fine from $5 to $25); MD. ANN. CODE tit. 78, § 35A, 
and tit. 89, § 64 (Supp. 1975) (civil fine of $25) . 
• 11 JACKSONVILLE, FLA. ORDINANCE CODE § 330.128 (Ordinance 73-180-91, Apr. 2, 1973) re-
stricts smoking in the Jacksonville Coliseum. 
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fenders to cease smoking, and to notify the police if offenders disre-
gard such requests. Smokers themselves would be subject to civil or 
criminal penalties. 
ApPENDIX: 
A MODEL STATE SMOKING POLLUTION PREVENTION 
ACT 
Sec. 1. The purpose of this Act is to prevent harm, discomfort, 
and annoyance due to smoking in enclosed public places, waiting 
lines, workplaces, and institutions. 
Sec. 2. In this Act, 
(a) "Smoking" means intentionally having in one's possession a 
lighted cigarette, cigar, pipe, or other object containing any sub-
stance giving off smoke. 
(b) "Enclosed public places" include but are not limited to eleva-
tors, buses, streetcars, railroad passenger cars, taxis, limousines, 
jitneys, airplanes, passenger boats, common carrier waiting rooms, 
libraries, theaters, concert halls, lecture halls, auditoriums, class-
rooms, museums, art galleries, planetariums, historic sites, dance 
halls, sports arenas, skating rinks, gymnasiums, swimming pools, 
bowling alleys, eating places, retail stores, banks, barber shops, 
beauty parlors, laundromats, telegraph offices, telephone business 
offices, polling places, voter registration places, welfare offices, 
rooms in which public meetings, public hearings, or other official 
proceedings open to the public are in progress, and health care 
waiting rooms. 
(c) "Eating place" means restaurant, cafe, diner, cafeteria, bar, 
night-club, or other place where food or drink is sold for consump-
tion on the premises. 
(d) "Workplace" means any indoor place where two or more per-
sons are gainfully employed. 
(e) "Institutions" include but are not limited to hospitals, nursing 
homes, sanitariums, homes for the aged, reformatories and prisons. 
(f) To "effectively segregate smoking" means to designate areas 
where smoking is permitted and prohibited such that smoke from 
the smoking areas does not cause harm, discomfort, or annoyance 
to persons in the no-smoking area. 
Sec. 3. In all enclosed public places, institutions, and work-
places where it is possible to effectively segregate smoking without 
constructing new partitions, the person in charge shall either pro-
hibit smoking entirely or effectively segregate smoking. 
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Sec. 4. In all institutions, workplaces, and enclosed public 
places, except as provided in sections 5, 6, and 7, where it is not 
possible to effectively segregate smoking without constructing new 
partitions, the person in charge shall either prohibit smoking en-
tirely or construct partitions to effectively segregate smoking. 
Sec. 5. Smoking is prohibited in all elevators. 
Sec. 6. In taxis, limousines, jitneys, and other public convey-
ances which are too small for smoking to be effectively segregated, 
smoking shall be allowed only when the driver and all passengers 
expressly consent. 
Sec. 7. In eating places where it is not possible to effectively 
segregate smoking without constructing new partitions, the person 
in charge may allow smoking entirely, prohibit smoking entirely, or 
construct partitions to effectively segregate smoking. 
Sec. 8. In any place where smoking is segregated under this Act, 
the size of the smoking area shall not be more than proportional to 
the demand of users of that place for a smoking area, and shall not 
include areas which all persons need to enter. 
Sec. 9. In any place, whether indoors or outdoors, where mem-
bers of the public, workers, or institutional inmates must wait in 
line for any purpose, smoking shall be prohibited unless it is possible 
to have effectively segregated no-smoking and smoking lines. 
Sec. 10. In any place or area where smoking is permitted under 
this Act, the person in charge may prohibit cigar or pipe smoking 
or both. 
Sec. 11. In any place where smoking is prohibited under this 
Act, the person in charge shall post conspicuous no-smoking signs 
and shall provide at the entrances to such no-smoking area facilities 
for the extinguishment of substances which persons have been 
smoking. 
Sec. 12. Anyone who smokes in a place or area where smoking 
is prohibited under this Act shall be subject to a civil fine of $25. 
Sec. 13. Anyone who removes or defaces any sign posted in ac-
cordance with this Act shall be subject to a fine of $50. 
Sec. 14. When anyone is smoking in a place where smoking is 
prohibited under this Act, it shall be the duty of the person in 
charge of that place to request the offender to cease smoking there. 
If the offender continues to smoke there after such a request, it shall 
be the duty of the person in charge to notify law enforcement au-
thorities. 
Sec. 15. Any person in charge of a place who willfully fails to 
comply with the provisions of sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, or 14 of 
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this Act shall be subject to a fine of $100 for each day of such failure 
to comply. These provisions shall also be enforceable by injunction, 
in an action brought by any affected party or by the State Depart-
ment of Health. 
Sec. 16. The State Department of Health shall have the power 
to promulgate regulations to facilitate implementation of this Act. 
The non-existence of regulations relating to particular applications 
of this Act shall not be a defense to a charge of noncompliance 
herewith. 
Sec. 17. This Act shall not be construed to prohibit smoking 
which is part of a theatrical performance or smoking at a privately 
sponsored social gathering not open to the general public. 
Sec. 18. This Act shall not be construed to allow smoking in any 
place where smoking is prohibited by any statute, ordinance, rule, 
or regulation. 
Sec. 19. Any current statute or any current or future ordinance, 
rule, or regulation which would allow smoking in any place where 
smoking is prohibited under this Act is to that extent void. 
Sec. 20. This Act shall not be construed to limit any common 
law rights to clean air. 
Sec. 21. If any portion or application of this Act should be de-
clared unconstitutional, the remaining portions or applications shall 
continue in effect. 
